Explained, The Offshore Wind Supply Chain

Where an Offshore Wind Farm Comes From

An offshore wind farm is one of the most supply-chain-intensive assets in the energy system. A single project draws on specialist steel mills, a handful of turbine makers, a small group of cable manufacturers, and a global electronics base, much of it concentrated in a few countries and, in some cases, a few factories.

This page sets out the major components of an offshore wind farm, the critical raw materials beneath them, and where in the world both are currently made. It then looks at how that map is changing. The concentration drives two things owners feel directly, lead times and exposure, and understanding where the parts come from is the first step to understanding where a project is exposed.

Figures are sourced and dated individually throughout, drawn from the IEA, industry market trackers, grid-operator procurement records and manufacturer disclosures. Supply chains shift constantly and country of origin varies by contract, so this is a point-in-time picture, current as of May 2026, not a fixed one.
94%
China share of permanent magnet production (IEA, 2024)
~74%
Siemens Gamesa share of offshore turbines outside China (BNEF, 2024)
~65%
Top five makers’ share of the subsea cable market (GMI, 2024)
4
HVDC converter suppliers on the UK grid framework (2025)

The major components

An offshore wind farm breaks down into a handful of major systems: the turbines, the steel foundations that hold them, the subsea cables that move the power, and the heavy electrical equipment that steps it up and sends it ashore. Each has its own supply story.

Wind turbine generators

The turbine is the most visible part of a wind farm and the most concentrated in supply. In offshore waters outside mainland China, a small group of Western manufacturers still dominates, Siemens Gamesa (Germany, Spain, Denmark), Vestas (Denmark) and GE Vernova (United States), while Chinese makers such as Mingyang and Goldwind dominate their home market and are beginning to push into Europe. Chinese OEMs now lead the global ranking overall, but that is driven by their vast home market; in offshore waters outside China, Western OEMs still supply the large majority. The two are often conflated.

Offshore turbine supply
MeasurePositionSource
Top offshore supplier outside mainland ChinaSiemens Gamesa, around three-quarters of offshore wind farms outside mainland ChinaBloombergNEF, 2024
China share of global offshore additionsMore than half, 6.1 GW of 11.7 GW added globallyBloombergNEF, 2024
Leading Western offshore OEMsSiemens Gamesa, Vestas, GE VernovaIndustry trackers, 2025–26
Leading Chinese OEMsMingyang, Goldwind, Envision (largely domestic to date)BloombergNEF / Wood Mackenzie, 2024

Blades and composites

Turbine blades are glass and carbon fibre composites over a structural core. The carbon fibre in the load-bearing spar is a concentrated supply chain in its own right: high-performance grades are dominated by Japanese producers, Toray (including its US Zoltek arm), Teijin and Mitsubishi, with Hexcel (US) and SGL (Germany) also present, while lower-cost large-tow capacity, the type favoured for wind blades, is expanding rapidly in China through Sinopec and CNBM. Blades themselves are made by TPI Composites and LM Wind Power, plus Vestas and Siemens Gamesa in-house.

Foundations and steel

Most offshore turbines stand on steel monopiles, large-diameter welded tubes driven into the seabed, with jackets used in deeper water. Monopile fabrication is European-led and the market is currently tight, with manufacturers reporting capacity booked years ahead. Beneath the fabricators sits the steel itself: the specialist heavy plate used for monopiles, thermomechanically rolled grades such as S355ML, comes from a small number of European mills, while commodity steel feedstock is more globally traded.

Foundations and structural steel
ItemMain suppliers and originSource
Monopile fabricationEEW (Germany, 2,200+ monopiles to date), Sif (Netherlands, ~200/yr Rotterdam plant), Steelwind Nordenham (Germany), Bladt / CS Wind (Denmark), Smulders (Belgium, transition pieces), Navantia (Spain)offshorewind.biz; Sif, 2024–25
Asian challengersDajin, Titan Wind (China); SeAH (South Korea)Valuates, 2026
Specialist heavy plateDillinger (Germany), supplied Hornsea One (~99,000t) and Borssele (70,000t); ArcelorMittal (Gijón, Spain and Industeel, France/Belgium)Dillinger; ArcelorMittal, 2024–25
Market conditionTight, Sif booked through 2025 with orders beyond; RWE reserved 320,000t of Steelwind capacity in advanceMatrixBCG; RWE, 2024–25

Subsea cables

Two kinds of cable matter: array cables linking turbines to the offshore substation, and export cables carrying aggregated power to shore, increasingly as high-voltage direct current (HVDC) for longer distances. The market is moderately concentrated, with a European top tier and strong Asian suppliers. The raw conductor, copper and aluminium, is globally traded; the bottleneck is manufacturing and installation capacity, not the metal, though copper cost is a growing pressure.

Subsea cable supply
SegmentMain suppliers and originSource
Market concentrationTop five makers hold roughly 65% of the marketGlobal Market Insights, 2024
European top tierPrysmian (Italy, largest), Nexans (France), NKT (Denmark)Industry sources, 2024–25
Asian suppliersSumitomo, Furukawa, Fujikura (Japan); LS Cable, Taihan (South Korea); ZTT, Hengtong, Orient Cable (China)Credence; UK grid framework, 2025
Array / dynamic cable specialistJDR (UK)NeoMarketData, 2025

Main electrical, transformers, switchgear and converters

Power leaves the turbines at medium voltage, is stepped up at an offshore substation, and sent ashore. The heavy electrical equipment, large power transformers, high-voltage gas-insulated switchgear (GIS), and HVDC converters, is supplied by a very small group of global firms, with specialist yards fabricating the platforms that house it. This is one of the most concentrated tiers in the entire chain. When the UK grid operator awarded its HVDC converter framework, it named just four eligible suppliers.

Heavy electrical equipment supply
ItemMain suppliers and originSource
HVDC converter systems (UK grid framework)Just four named: GE Vernova (US), Hitachi Energy (Switzerland/Japan), Mitsubishi Electric (Japan), Siemens Energy (Germany)Transformer Magazine, 2025
Large power transformers and GISSame group plus Hyundai (South Korea)Leadvent, 2025
Converter platform fabricatorsAibel, Aker Solutions, Petrofac, SeatriumLeadvent; Transformer Magazine, 2025
Transformer supply deficitGeneration step-up transformer shortfall around 100% in 2025, projected below 10% by 2030 as capacity rampsWood Mackenzie, 2025–26

Control systems and electronics

A wind farm is also a distributed control system. Unlike the items above, this is a shared global electronics supply chain, not specific to offshore wind, the same components run factories, ships, grids and data centres, so the picture is qualitative rather than wind-specific. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and protection relays come from the established industrial automation names, Siemens, ABB, Schneider, Rockwell, SEL and GE among them. Servers, switches and firewalls come from the usual IT majors but are physically assembled across Asia, and semiconductors underneath are concentrated in a small number of Asian foundries.

The offshore-specific wrinkle is ruggedisation. Equipment on a substation topside or inside a nacelle has to survive salt, vibration, wide temperature swings and, in places, hazardous-area conditions. That tends to draw on a narrower pool of marine and hazardous-area-rated components, conformal-coated boards, wide-temperature parts, higher ingress-protection ratings, which is a smaller, more specialist segment than commercial-grade kit, and can carry longer lead times as a result.

Critical raw materials beneath the components

Below the finished components sits a layer of raw materials, and this is where the sharpest dependencies appear. The umbrella term used in EU and UK policy is critical raw materials: the inputs whose supply is concentrated enough, and important enough, to pose a strategic risk.

Rare earth elements, the magnet metals

Direct-drive turbine generators use powerful permanent magnets, and those magnets depend on four rare earth elements: neodymium and praseodymium, with dysprosium and terbium added to hold magnetism at high temperature.

The name is misleading. Rare earth elements are not geologically rare, they are reasonably abundant in the Earth’s crust. What makes them critical is that they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, and that extracting, separating and refining them is technically difficult, capital-intensive and environmentally demanding. The dependency is about processing capability, not scarcity in the ground, which is exactly why the supply chain has concentrated in one country rather than tracking where the rock happens to be. That distinction shows up clearly in the numbers: China’s share of mining is large, its share of refining and magnet-making far larger, and the gap between the two is the whole story.

Figure 01, Concentration by stage

China’s share of the magnet rare earth chain

Share of world total at each stage, mining through to finished permanent magnets
Source: IEA Rare Earth Elements report, 2024 data (report revised May 2026). Magnet rare earths are neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. The y-axis is fixed 0 to 100 so each bar reads as a share of the world total; the rising shape reflects deepening concentration downstream, not a change of scale.

The risk is not theoretical. China introduced export controls on several rare earth elements and magnets in April 2025, and a wider set in October 2025 (since suspended, with a review due in late 2026), causing real short-term disruption to manufacturers outside China and a lasting price premium on non-Chinese magnets.

The other critical inputs

Rare earths get the headlines, but they are not the only constraint, and the magnet itself is mostly iron, not rare earth metal.

Other critical raw materials
MaterialRole and dependencySource
Iron and boronThe bulk of an NdFeB magnet, the iron (Fe) and boron (B), alongside the rare earths. Often overlooked because the rare earths dominate the conversation.General metallurgy
CopperWindings, cables and earthing throughout. Globally traded but a binding cost constraint, price up more than 40% since early 2020.Electrical Trader, 2026
Grain-oriented electrical steel (GOES)The core of every transformer. Highly consolidated, a handful of premium producers worldwide (Nippon Steel, JFE, POSCO, Thyssenkrupp, ArcelorMittal, Baowu, Cleveland-Cliffs), and a direct cause of transformer lead times. GOES prices have nearly doubled since 2020.Mordor; FactMR; Electrical Trader, 2025–26

Where the dependencies really sit

Put the picture together and the exposure is uneven. The West is reasonably self-sufficient in some tiers and deeply dependent on a small number of suppliers, sometimes a single country, in others.

Concentration at a glance
TierWhere it standsConcentration
Foundations and structural steelEuropean-led fabrication and specialist plateLower risk
Subsea cablesEuropean and Asian suppliers, capacity-constrained but diversifiedModerate
Turbine assembly (offshore, ex-China)Western OEMs still leadModerate
Large transformers, GIS, HVDC convertersA handful of global firms, long lead timesHigher risk
Grain-oriented electrical steelVery few premium mills worldwideHigher risk
Rare earth magnetsChina dominant in refining (91%) and magnets (94%)Highest risk
Semiconductors and control electronicsShared global chain, concentrated Asian fabricationHigher risk

The short version: foundations, cables and turbine assembly are reasonably secure for Western projects. The exposure is concentrated in the things hardest to substitute quickly, the magnets, the transformer steel, and the chips, all of which route back through a small number of suppliers and, in the case of rare earths, overwhelmingly through one country.

Supply chain look ahead

The picture above is today’s. It is also changing. Governments and industry on both sides of the Atlantic are spending heavily to loosen the tightest dependencies, above all in rare earth magnets, transformers and electrical steel. The direction of travel is clear; the pace is not, and almost none of it is guaranteed.

A word on geopolitics

Everything in this outlook sits downstream of global politics, and that matters more here than almost anywhere else in the supply chain. Export controls, tariffs, retaliation, conflict, shipping disruption, resource nationalism and shifts in industrial policy can redraw this map faster than any factory can be built. The rare earth export controls introduced in 2025 are the live proof: a single policy decision moved prices and availability worldwide within weeks, far quicker than any of the capacity build-outs below can respond. Treat what follows as direction of travel under current conditions, not a forecast. The single most likely thing to change it is a political decision, not a market one.

Rare earths and magnets, the build-out beyond China

This is where the most determined effort is going, because it is the sharpest dependency. Both the EU and the US are trying to stand up rare earth processing and magnet-making capacity outside China, the refining and magnet stages where China’s share is highest.

Figure 02, The plan versus today

EU rare earth extraction, single-country dependence

Dependence on a single supplier country, today against the 2030 target
Source: Council of the EU, 2026, under the Critical Raw Materials Act and its selected strategic projects. The 2030 figure is a target and a projection, not an achieved outcome. The y-axis is fixed 0 to 100 to match Figure 01.
Efforts to diversify the magnet supply chain
InitiativeWhat it aims to doSource
EU Critical Raw Materials Act, 2030 targetsAt least 10% of EU consumption from domestic extraction, 40% processing, 25% recycling, and no more than 65% of any strategic material from a single third countryCouncil of the EU; IEA, 2024–26
EU strategic projects (selected 2025)Aim to cut single-country dependence for rare earth extraction from around 95% to 42%; 47 projects fast-trackedCouncil of the EU, 2026
European plantsNeo Performance Materials opened a magnet factory in Estonia; Solvay began rare earth processing in France (2025)WindEurope, 2025
US, MP MaterialsUS DoD took a ~15% stake ($400m, July 2025) with an NdPr price floor; first commercial NdFeB magnet production in 2025; $1.25bn “10X” Texas magnet campus announced Feb 2026, first product expected 2028MP Materials; CNBC, 2025–26
US, USA Rare EarthOklahoma sintered-magnet facility targeting first commercial production in 2026SFA Oxford, 2026
Honest read. These are real and well-funded, but early. The EU’s own targets are widely seen as ambitious relative to delivery, recyclers face weak demand pull, and the US build-out depends on government offtake and price support rather than open-market economics. They will narrow the gap over this decade, not close it overnight, and the 95%-to-42% figure is a projection, not an outcome.

Transformers and electrical steel, capacity being rebuilt

The transformer shortage has triggered the largest wave of new factory investment in decades, concentrated in the US but also in Europe. Hitachi Energy has committed more than $1bn across US sites, Siemens Energy is building its first US large-power-transformer plant in Charlotte, North Carolina (production expected around 2027), and Eaton has committed $340m to a South Carolina facility on a similar timeline. The constraint is easing, but slowly: demand has more than doubled since 2019 and analysts still expect multi-year deficits even as the new plants come online. Electrical steel sits underneath this, new transformer capacity only helps if the grain-oriented steel to feed it scales too, which is the slower-moving half of the problem.

Turbines and cables, the patterns to watch

Two shifts matter for the rest of the chain. First, Chinese turbine makers, already dominant at home, are pushing into European and other international waters; whether they win significant share outside China is one of the defining questions for the turbine supply chain this decade. Second, cable manufacturers are adding factory capacity to relieve the current bottleneck, though new high-voltage cable plants, and the vessels to install them, take years to come online, a topic for the ports and vessels page.

Sources and methodology. Rare earth concentration data is drawn from the International Energy Agency Rare Earth Elements report, 2024 data. EU diversification targets and projections are from the Council of the EU under the Critical Raw Materials Act. Component and supplier detail draws on industry market trackers, grid-operator procurement records and manufacturer disclosures, cited inline with dates. Where a figure is a forecast or target rather than an achieved outcome, it is flagged as such. Figures are current as of May 2026 and should be treated as a point-in-time snapshot. Live verified figures for logged-in users sit in the EOS Omnia L1 and L2 data layers.
Offshore Wind - supply Chain | EOS Omnia